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Abstract1
In addition to being a hazardous air pollutant, Black Carbon is the second-largest contributor to
Arctic warming. Its mitigation is being addressed at the international regulatory level by the Arctic
Council and the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP). Whilst the
Convention and its protocols are binding documents, the Black Carbon regulation under their
framework appears to have ‘soft law’ characteristics. At the same time, the voluntary Black Carbon
and Methane Framework, adopted by the Arctic Council, demonstrates positive compliance and
follow-up dynamics compared to earlier norm-creating attempts. This paper argues that the nature of
the norm (binding or non-binding) is not the decisive factor regarding effective implementation in the
Arctic region. Current efforts to mitigate Black Carbon by means of a non-binding Arctic Council
Black Carbon and Methane Framework represent an improvement in the Council’s normative
function and may have more effect on the behaviour of Arctic States than relevant provisions under
the Gothenburg Protocol to the CLRTAP. To support this argument, the first section presents an
overview of the Arctic Council as an actor in Arctic policy-making. It then provides an assessment of
current efforts to combat Black Carbon carried out by the Arctic Council and the CLRTAP.
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Black Carbon (or soot), the second-largest contributor to Arctic warming,2 has been
on the agenda of climate activists and international institutions for several years now.3
However, it was not until 2015 that the Arctic Council adopted a framework to reduce
emissions of this particulate matter.4 As the Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of
the world,5 approaching the tipping point in a not so distant future,6 the necessity to
take steps to lower the warming level has become urgent. Black Carbon (BC) is a short-
lived climate forcer, meaning it only remains in the atmosphere for a few days or weeks.
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Therefore, while efforts to reduce BC cannot replace long-term efforts to mitigate
CO2 emissions,
7 immediate reductions in BC emissions could lower the rate of
Arctic warming over the next few decades.8 In addition to its warming effects, BC
has negative effects on human health causing respiratory diseases that sometimes lead
to premature deaths.9
The present paper examines whether the current efforts of BC mitigation by means of
the Arctic Council’s non-binding Framework demonstrate an improvement in the
Council’s normative function and may have more effect on the behaviour of the Arctic
States than the relevant obligations under the legally binding Gothenburg Protocol to the
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP). To this end, the
first section introduces BC as an Arctic pollutant. The paper goes on to analyse BC
regulation under CLRTAP. Then it presents an overview of the Arctic Council as an actor
in Arctic policy-making. The fourth section examines the Arctic Council’s work on regu-
lating BC. Finally, the fifth section evaluates national implementation of this regulation.
1. BC as an Arctic Pollutant
BC, a particulate matter ‘formed through the incomplete combustion of fossil fuels,
biofuel, and biomass,’10 warms the atmosphere by absorbing sunlight. In the Arctic,
the effects of BC are especially noticeable since it darkens snow and ice thus reducing
the albedo (ability to reflect sunlight) effect.11 Melting snow and ice expose dark
ocean or land that has a much lower albedo and absorbs even more sunlight thus
creating a positive feedback loop.
In the Arctic, BC sources include open burning, and the use of diesel for vehicles
and electricity generation.12 Until recently, the oil and gas sector was not believed to
be responsible for significant BC emissions in the High North.13 However, recent
studies reveal that this sector’s share of hydrocarbons emissions has been under-
estimated.14 It is estimated that around 42% of BC in the Arctic arises from associated
petroleum gas (APG) flaring during oil and gas production in the region.15 Whereas
BC emissions from shipping have not yet been identified as a primary source, they are
expected to increase with a high-growth scenario for Arctic shipping ‘nearly fivefold
by 2030 and over 18-fold by 2050.’16 A recent open letter from 15 environmental
NGOs to the Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials group calls for a ban on heavy fuel
oil, a primary source of BC emissions from ships.17
The distinct nature of the BC problem is that it is both an air pollutant and
a contributor to climate change. Air quality is one of the major branches of inter-
national environmental law, starting with the Trail Smelter arbitration in 1939.18
On the international level, BC, as an air pollutant, is covered by Gothenburg Protocol
to the CLRTAP. As a climate forcer, it is addressed by the non-binding framework of
the Arctic Council. This ‘dual’ nature makes it possible to reduce BC’s warming
effects while also reducing population health risks. The Council, a high-level inter-
governmental forum of Arctic States, recognises the challenges presented by climate
change and is working on its mitigation through joint assessment and non-binding
legislation.19 The Arctic States chair the Council in two-year rotations, with each
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chair State focusing on certain topics. The US, as the new chair State, has chosen
to address the impacts of climate change as one of three focus areas for 20152017
and has emphasised the necessity of addressing the BC issue.20
The CLRTAP is ‘the only major regional multilateral agreement devoted to
the regulation and control of transboundary air pollution.’21 The Convention was
adopted under the auspices of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE).
Despite its European focus, Canada and the US are members of UNECE and
CLRTAP signatories. This is particularly relevant since Canada and the US are
both Arctic States and large BC emitters. The Gothenburg Protocol to the CLRTAP,
which defines quantitative reduction targets, was amended in 2012 to include PM2.5,
or particulate matter less than 2.5 micrometres in diameter, of which BC is a
component.22
2. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and BC
BC has been on the research and political agenda internationally for several years.23
In 2009, the Executive Body of the CLRTAP24 established an Ad Hoc Expert Group
on Black Carbon,25 with particular reference to the unique role BC plays in snow
and ice-covered areas, such as the Arctic. The CLRTAP is in principle different from
the Arctic Council: it is not primarily concerned, nor was it designed to be, with the
Arctic environment specifically.26 It is an international, legally binding agreement, a
source of international law as defined by the International Court of Justice Statute.27
It was first adopted in response to European acid rain problems, but has since
expanded its influence to many other air pollution issues through the adoption of
additional protocols. Nevertheless, it is worth analysing the CLRTAP in the context
of BC pollution to demonstrate any potential interaction and/ or differences in effects
between this targeted regional, but non-binding approach, and a broader binding
international legal instrument.
In 2012, upon the recommendations of the Expert Group, the Gothenburg
Protocol to the CLRTAP28 was updated to include PM2.5, or ‘particulate matter’ of
which BC is a component.29 It is important to stress, at this point, that whilst the
Gothenburg Protocol is a legally binding instrument, its BC provisions are voluntary.
The voluntary nature of the provisions is reiterated by using specific wording, such as
‘should’ and ‘as [a State] considers appropriate.’30
However, whilst all the Arctic States are Parties to the CLRTAP, Canada, Russia
and Iceland have not yet ratified the Protocol. Even for State Parties, the Protocol
provides flexible mechanisms with regards to amendments. Amendments to the
Protocol are approved by consensus, which ‘politicizes a decision that ought to be
based on objective scientific criteria and the precautionary principle.’31 Moreover,
even after adoption, the amendment to Annex II (Reduction Commitments) does
not enter into force immediately. It only does so for Parties that have explicitly
accepted the amendment 90 days after two thirds of Parties at the time of adoption
expressed their acceptance.32 This mechanism has allowed the US to set an
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indicative target for PM2.5 reduction,
33 rather than accepting any binding reduction
targets. Thus, out of eight Arctic States, only the four Nordic countries have agreed
to PM2.5 reduction goals. With Canada, Russia and the US out of the picture, the
biggest polluters in the Arctic are either left outside the jurisdiction of the Protocol or
do not have binding reduction obligations under it.
The questions remain: Should all of the Arctic States ratify the Gothenburg
Protocol and/or its 2012 amendment? If so, would this be an effective solution to the
Arctic BC problem?
The CLRTAP proved itself effective in dealing with acid rain, the problem that
prompted its creation.34 However, it is argued that improvements came from
‘domestic factors largely unrelated to the CLRTAP.’35 Compliance with the Protocol
is reviewed by the Implementation Committee of the CLRTAP,36 which meets twice
a year to review reports submitted by State Parties.37 Should the Committee not be
satisfied with compliance, it then prepares a report for the Executive Body, which
can then issue a compliance note urging a Party to ‘fulfil its obligations as soon as
possible.’38 No other compliance mechanism is provided for in the Protocol.
Moreover, reporting on BC is explicitly voluntary under the Protocol.39
Thus, despite the Gothenburg Protocol being a binding international instrument,
it is fair to argue that the regulation of BC under its framework is more characteristic
of soft law.40 That being said, it is not clear whether the 2012 amendments to the
Protocol will actually create changes in the national legislation of the Arctic States
that will help reduce BC emissions. The four Nordic Arctic States were the only
States to undertake quantitative PM2.5 reduction goals. They have agreed to reduce
their emissions by around 30% compared to 2005 levels.41 However, work to reduce
SLCFs and PM had begun in these States prior to these commitments.42 In fact, it
was Norway that proposed the amendments to the Protocol in the first place.43 Thus,
while at this point, the CLRTAP might not be the most effective instrument to
combat BC in the Arctic, it is an important venue for further scientific work and
abatement strategies. With further insights on Arctic BC research from the Arctic
Council’s Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), it could have
more potential for effectiveness in the future.
3. Arctic Council as an Influencer in Environmental Policy-Making
Growing awareness of the Arctic as a unique region of the world has led to the
emergence of distinct Arctic regimes in international law.44 The Arctic environ-
mental legal regime consists of the relevant national legislation of the Arctic States,
international binding agreements and soft law documents, customary law, and the
frameworks developed by the Arctic Council.
Environmental protection of the Arctic was the driving factor that first brought
the Arctic States together to establish the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy
(AEPS) in 1991. Prior to the AEPS, there had been occasional cases of cooperation
on environmental matters between the Arctic States, such as the 1973 Polar
Bear Conservation Agreement45 and 1911 Fur Seals Agreement.46 AEPS later
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transformed into the Arctic Council, which was established in 199647 as a high-
level intergovernmental forum of the Arctic States.48 The Arctic Council is usually
described as a ‘soft law regime’49 as it does not have the power to make binding
decisions. Although academics and commentators regularly call for a ‘binding
Arctic treaty’ to be adopted to ensure environmental protection of the region;50 the
Council has been working for 20 years both as a knowledge institution and a policy
influencer.
The effectiveness of the Council as an institution and an Arctic regime-maker
has been the focus of several studies in recent years.51 In 2007, Geir Hønnelannd
and Olav Stokke of the Fridtjof Nansen Institute published a study that concludes
that the Council is most effective in areas where it ‘enjoys niche advantages’52 such
as environmental monitoring, encouraging the Arctic States to take a common stand
on hazardous pollutants and ‘capacity enhancement in certain areas.’53 However,
when it comes to its normative contribution, the authors conclude that the Council’s
capacities are ‘limited’.54
Since this publication, the Arctic Council has become more active as a norm creator
and influencer. It has hosted the adoption of two binding treaties,55 updated its
voluntary guidelines56 and concluded a new framework agreement.57 The normative
function of the Council, however, is still viewed by some as something that should be
left to the complex governance framework surrounding the region, focusing instead
on conducting ‘large-scale scientific assessments’ that assist policy-shaping.58
Indeed, the Council, as a knowledge institution, successfully provides policy-
makers with valuable scientific data from the Arctic.59 Serving as a mediator between
science and policy-makers, the Council assisted with ‘raising the visibility’60 of certain
problematic issues on the Arctic policy agenda, of which BC is one. In some cases,
this has translated into better policies for the region coming from other international
fora. In particular, the Council’s role in negotiations on the Stockholm Persistent
Organic Pollutants (POPs) Convention61 and Minamata Mercury Convention62 has
been emphasized.63
The Stockholm POPs Convention was negotiated with the active involvement
of those mainly affected by POPs, Arctic indigenous peoples.64 It was signed and
ratified by seven of the eight Arctic States.65 Arctic ecosystems and indigenous
communities are specifically mentioned in the preamble of the Convention as
‘particularly at risk.’66 In addition, scientific data provided by the AMAP was ‘used
effectively’ in the preparatory process leading up to the Stockholm Convention. The
Finnish representative reportedly intervened on behalf of the Arctic Council during
the negotiations to promote regional concerns.67
Moreover, the Convention contains a provision that requires effectiveness evalua-
tion every four years.68 This monitoring activity brings together researchers from
regional groups to collect and analyse data on POPs emissions reduction. The
AMAP69 conducts these assessments for the Arctic region. Recent data demonstrates
a reduction and stabilisation in POPs concentrations across the Arctic region.70
The Arctic Council has been an important actor in the POPs regime creation
through its scientific, as well as institutional capacity. However, so far the Council’s
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climate-related findings have ‘had very limited concrete influence on global and
national climate law and policy’.71 The Council’s involvement with BC issues is
addressed in the next section.
4. The Arctic Council and BC
The Arctic Council first acknowledged short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs)72 in 2009,
during a Ministerial Meeting in Tromsø, Norway, by creating a Task Force on SLCFs
and charging it with the task ‘to identify existing and new measures to reduce
emissions of these forcers and recommend further immediate actions that can be
taken and to report on progress at the next Ministerial Meeting.’73 Later in the year,
the task was refined to focus on BC due to its ‘unique role’74 in the Arctic. After
publishing two reports,75 the Task Force was restructured into the Task for Action
on BC and Methane (TFABCM).76 In 2013, during a Ministerial Meeting in
Kiruna, Sweden, the Council recognised that a reduction in BC emissions ‘could
slow Arctic and global climate change and have positive effects on health’77 and made
national BC emissions inventories ‘a matter of priority.’78 The main normative
deliverable produced following the work of the Task Force is the Framework for
Enhanced Action to Reduce Black Carbon and Methane Emissions.79 It was decided
that the document would refrain from setting any quantitative targets until 2017,
even though just two months prior to this decision during the fifth meeting of the
TFABCM, ‘most [participants] indicated a preference for a quantitative vision’.80
Instead, the Framework was intended to ‘send a strong political signal in the form
of an ambitious, politically aspirational collective vision.’81 The Framework has been
received as a ‘breakthrough.’82 The decision not to set a common reduction target
can be explained by a number of factors. First, scientific work on BC emissions
sources, detection, and analysis is still ongoing. Some large emitters, such as Russia,
have not had effectively documented inventories until recently.83 Second, setting
quantitative targets for the Arctic States alone would not solve the problem, as large
quantities of BC come from Western Europe and South East Asia.
It was noted that this document marked ‘the first time that Arctic nations have
formally agreed to work together to mitigate climate change (. . .) sending a hugely
important political message that climate change mitigation can be organized
regionally as well as globally.’84 Implementation of the Framework will be assessed
by the Expert Group once every two years with the first results expected in 2017.
Whilst the document has been initially well-received, it will be behavioural changes
at the national level that determine its success. The framework might be a positive
starting point in the normative regulation of BC. However, the Arctic Council’s
non-binding documents lack follow-up mechanisms.85 For the BC and Methane
Framework to achieve its goals, it requires national follow-up, implementation and
reporting.
The first outcomes of the Framework were received in September 2015 when the
first round of reports was submitted. The scope of the Framework does not end at
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reporting; a compilation of national submissions is reviewed by the Expert Group,
which, in turn, issues ‘conclusions and specific recommendations’86 to guide further
action. The Arctic Council thus uses its scientific capacity to evaluate policy actions
and effects, which might prove more effective than simply issuing guidelines. To
provide more insight into this process, the reports and actions of the Arctic States on
BC emissions at the national level are analysed in the next section.
5. Effectiveness and National Implementation
As of March 2016, all of the Arctic Council States, eight Observer States, and the
EU had submitted their reports to the Council. These national submissions are not
standard emissions data sheets, but rather comprehensive reports containing
mitigation measures, Arctic-relevant project descriptions, cross-border cooperation
examples, and best practices.
The national submissions under the Arctic Council’s Framework are varied and
should be analysed in the context of individual BC emissions levels. Thus, for
example, Iceland’s non-submission of a full BC inventory might be viewed as non-
compliance. Yet, when analysed in a broader context, it can be asserted that Iceland’s
BC emissions are negligible compared to the other Arctic States (see Figure 1 below).
The main takeaways of the national submissions and the subsequent actions taken
by the Arctic States are as follows: on the whole, BC emissions across the region are
in decline, mostly through national air pollution regulations; the sources of BC vary
across the States; the Arctic Council’s Framework has facilitated the creation of
political momentum that has enhanced BC research and political action; the Arctic
BC mitigation action is further reinforced by the availability of the AMAP’s
monitoring capacity. These assumptions are elaborated below.
In general, BC emissions have been in decline over the past decade. That being
said, BC has never been a direct target of legislation. This is where the dual nature of
BC as an air pollutant and a climate forcer comes into play. At the national level, BC
has been addressed indirectly, through air pollution control laws, rather than climate
change frameworks. Additionally, a number of projects directed at mitigating BC and
funded by the Council’s Project Support Instrument were implemented in the
Russian Arctic. These projects include joint US-Russia initiatives to update the bus
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Figure 1. Annual BC emissions in the Arctic States
Data source: national submissions of the Arctic States.
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fleet in the Murmansk area87 and energy upgrades to off-grid cluster settlements in
Karelia.88 Sources of BC vary largely across the Arctic States: in Russia, almost half
of BC emissions comes from flaring and venting. However, prior to targeted BC
assessment in the Russian Arctic, it was believed that the two main sources were
‘forest fires and firewood, coal, and liquid fuel combustion by individuals and small
boilers.’89 Thus, the oil and gas industry’s contribution to Russian BC emissions has
been largely underestimated. Russia flares the second-largest amount of associated
petroleum gas in the world (after Nigeria) and would benefit from improving its
relevant laws and working closely with the oil and gas sector in their implementation.90
The Russian submission states that since a new system of fines for gas flaring came
into effect in early 2015, flaring levels have been ‘cut in half.’91
In Canada and the US, most BC pollution originates from mobile sources and
diesel-powered transport. The US submission credits its national regulations on new
and existing engines with the gradual BC emissions decline, but admits that potential
exists for further reduction from residential wood burning as well as oil and gas
development activities. In the US National Strategy for the Arctic Region Imple-
mentation Framework, implementation of the Arctic Council Framework is
mentioned specifically in the broader context of BC reduction. Participation in
CLRTAP activities is discussed in the context of involving AMAP and ‘other
international platforms.’92 Moreover, the most recent Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management has proposed air quality control regulations for oil and gas operations on
the outer continental shelf (including Alaska) and specifically mentioned warming
effects of BC and concerns over its depositions on snow and ice in Alaska and
other parts of the Arctic.93 Canada refers to its commitment as a member of the
Arctic Council as a prompt to produce annual BC emissions inventories.94 These
commitments are reiterated in the latest 2016 inventory.95 National mitigation
measures in Canada are similar to the ones in the US; existing reductions are mainly
credited to transportation regulations. Further reduction is anticipated through new
standards on air quality for the industry as well as localised projects in remote
settlements that rely mostly on diesel fuel for electricity generation.
In the Nordic countries, the primary source of BC emissions is stationary
residential. Norway refers to knowledge gathering on mitigation strategies96 as well
as best practices for reducing emissions from the oil and gas sector.97 Sweden and
Finland list existing sectoral mitigation regulations as well as ongoing work with the
EU as having potential for future reductions. Especially in the Nordic context, the
EU Ecodesign Directive regulating residential heating emissions limit values is
relevant and mentioned by both submissions.
In addition to the Arctic Council States, eight Observers and the EU also
submitted national reports. Whilst not as elaborate as the Arctic States, they do
represent a step towards a more inclusive role of Observers in the Council. Given
that Asian States account for 43% of BC burdens in the Arctic,98 involving them in
this process holds significant potential. However, as Professor Johnstone points out,
negotiating a binding treaty with them would take the matter out of the Council’s
control and be ‘more difficult and time-consuming.’99
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The methodology the Council uses for BC reporting has certain advantages. The
first advantage is the influence the Council holds over its observers. Emissions from
the Arctic States account for only about a third of the warming effects of BC in the
region.100 Bringing other States into the Framework would potentially stimulate
technology transfer and better coordination of national policies, where relevant.
While the Gothenburg Protocol has a wider participation number-wise, the Arctic
Council’s observers include States that contribute greatly to BC concentrations in
the Arctic, namely: China, India, Japan, South Korea, India, and Singapore.101 The
second advantage is that the Arctic Council coordinates reporting with another
international instrument that deals with BC  the Gothenburg Protocol to the
CLRTAP.102 For some States, the reporting requirements of the BC and Methane
Framework overlap with the requirements of the CLRTAP. The Framework allows
these States to send the Council the ‘same submission they sent to the CLRTAP’, or
more simply, the information regarding ‘where it can be collected on the CLRTAP
public website.’103 Simply referencing or providing a link to the CLRTAP data in the
emissions level chapters of the national submissions avoids double-reporting and
takes the burden off the national institutions responsible for compiling and sending
the data.104 Since the work on BC in the Arctic Council began in 2009 and its
inclusion in the CLRTAP only occurred in 2012, it is not clear what triggered the
initial inventory collection by the Arctic States. However, the Canadian 2016
inventory suggests that ‘Environment Ministers from Arctic States had previously
agreed that the inventories [produced under the Arctic Council Framework] could
be voluntarily submitted under the CLRTAP.’105
Additionally, certain States note that the data collection methodology is still under
development. The non-binding nature of the Arctic Council Framework allows the
document to be flexible and adjustable in the future, should science provide a clearer
picture.
Overall, the BC and Methane Framework has had a greater influence on States in
the short-term than earlier voluntary documents from the Council.106 It is, however,
worth noting that some of the States started working on the BC issue prior to signing
the Framework107 and some of their mitigation strategies might result from
obligations under separate commitments (such as compliance with EU legislation
and the CLRTAP Gothenburg Protocol).108 It is, therefore, problematic to establish
the causal links between the Framework and implemented mitigation strategies or to
assess fully its effectiveness at this stage.
6. Conclusions
In the presence of many overlapping treaties and regimes in the Arctic, it can be
argued that the focus should be on the implementation of existing obligations rather
than creating new overarching treaties.109 However, the presence of two separate
legal documents that cover the issue of BC emissions should not be viewed
negatively, especially since there is ongoing coordination between the two.110 In
addition to the utilisation of reporting under the CLRTAP for the purposes of the
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Arctic Council Framework, there are coordination meetings conducted between
the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme and the CLRTAP. Currently, the
voluntary BC reports under CLRTAP primarily contain emissions data, while the
Arctic Council Framework also gathers information on national mitigation strategies
and examples of international cooperation, as well as on relevant projects and best
practices.
A comparison of the two parallel normative efforts to combat BC is important in
two respects. First, the correlation between the formal affiliation of a normative
instrument within the realm of ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ law and its effectiveness might be
overrated. In the present case, States are still reluctant to undertake binding
emissions reduction obligations despite the fact that BC emissions are in steady
decline due to existing national policies. BC provisions in the legally binding
Gothenburg Protocol have soft law characteristics and do not create concrete
obligations for most of the Arctic States.
A flexible framework tailored in accordance with an improved understanding of
BC sources and effects is needed at this stage. Such flexibility is likely to best
provided by the Arctic Council Framework due to its ability to rapidly change the
focus of its work in accordance with priorities. Moreover, the Council’s Framework is
supported by substantial scientific assessment work, funding for demonstration
projects, and a sharing of best practices between the Arctic States as well as
Observers through the Arctic Council. Additionally, an analysis of the first round of
submissions under the Arctic Council framework reveals that there is no ‘one-size-
fits-all’ solution for reducing Arctic BC. The primary source of BC differs across the
region: while Russia would benefit from further improving its flaring legislation, for
the Nordic countries it would be more advantageous to focus on a reduction of
emissions from wood burning.111 The ongoing targets in the Council regarding BC
may have helped to place BC issues high on the national political agendas of the
Arctic States, and may also have initiated the collection of emission inventories.
Finally, The Arctic Council is growing as a policy-influencer and a ‘knowledge
institution’ as argued by eminent scholars Koivurova, Kankaanpa¨a¨, and Ste˛pien.112
The BC and Methane Framework represents an improvement on earlier soft law
instruments that were criticised for a lack of follow-up. The dominant position of BC
on the agenda of the previous Canadian as well as current US Chairmanship at the
Arctic Council appears to be yielding its first results.
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